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“Universities are generally not inclined to litigate. . . . A lot of
private sector companies, the big ones, look at universities as toothless
tigers, because they are not going to assert their patent rights.” –Howard
Bremer 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The pursuit of patents is a key avenue of economic development
and revenue generation for American research universities, and one with
significant policy implications for higher education. 2 In a time of
shifting funding models for higher education,3 the $1.8 billion dollars
American universities generated in revenues in 2011 from licensing their
patents 4 makes patenting an attractive candidate for further university
attention and resource investment. Spurred in part by the Bayh-Dole Act
of 1980, 5 research universities across the country have created vast
institutional apparatuses—typically centered in technology transfer
offices (“TTOs”)—to help move ideas invented in the laboratory and
1. Transcribed Interview with Howard Bremer, Emeritus Patent Counsel, Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Mar. 1, 2011) (on file with author). An architect of the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Howard Bremer served for over forty years as patent counsel to the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (the patent and licensing organization affiliated with the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, known within the industry as WARF).
2. See CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK? BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001); ROGER L. GEIGER, KNOWLEDGE AND MONEY: RESEARCH
UNIVERSITIES AND THE PARADOX OF THE MARKETPLACE (2004).
3. See, e.g., E. Gordon Gee, Colleges Must Find Innovative Ways to Finance Their
Missions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 30, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Must-FindInnovative/129568/ (noting that state support of higher education as a percentage of total operating
budgets will never return to pre-2000 levels); William R. Doyle & Jennifer A. Delaney, Higher
Education Funding: The New Normal, 41 CHANGE: THE MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING 60-62 (2009)
(same).
4. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Universities Report $1.8-Billion in Earnings on Inventions in
2011, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 28, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/University-InventionsEarned/133972/ (reporting that 157 research universities received approximately $1.8 billion in
licensing revenues in fiscal year 2011).
5. Signed into law by President Carter on December 12, 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act added a
chapter to the nation’s patent laws that allows universities to retain ownership of faculty inventions
that are discovered in the course of federally funded research. Originally introduced as the
University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, the Bayh-Dole Act was named in honor of its
bi-partisan sponsors, former Senator Birch Bayh (D-IN) and former Senator Bob Dole (R-KS). For
more information on this “remarkably important piece of science policy legislation,” JONATHAN R.
COLE, THE GREAT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: ITS RISE TO PREEMINENCE, ITS INDISPENSABLE
NATIONAL ROLE, WHY IT MUST BE PROTECTED 163 (2009), see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996); Sean M. O’Connor, Mistaken Assumptions: The Roots of
Stanford v. Roche in Post-War Government Patent Policy (Mar. 15, 2012) (unpublished Univ. of
Wash. Sch. of Law Research. Paper No. 2012-05), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024631.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/5

2

Rooksby: When Tigers Bear Teeth
ARTICLE 5 - ROOKSBY_DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

WHEN TIGERS BARE TEETH

4/4/2013 4:30 PM

171

classroom into commercial application.6
A patent is a government-granted right that gives its holder the
ability to exclude others from manufacturing, using, selling, offering for
sale, or importing any product or process claimed by the patent for
twenty years from the date of application. 7 Patents are notoriously
expensive to obtain and even more expensive to enforce.8 Because
patents are not self-enforcing, owners of them face pressure to pursue
infringers if they wish to maintain the market exclusivity provided by
their patent. 9 An infringed patent quickly loses value if the owner does
not seek to end the infringement by suing the infringer in the hope of
obtaining a court order enjoining the infringement and awarding
lucrative damages to the patent owner. In this way, to some extent every
patent’s value flows from the threat of litigation. 10
Yet despite the increasing importance of patents in generating
revenue for research universities,11 to date little scholarly attention has
been given to the considerations that influence universities to enforce
their patents through pursuing infringement litigation. 12 This article
describes one of the first focused studies of university behavior in this

6. See generally DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE
UNITED STATES (2004) (providing a detailed history of the Bayh-Dole Act, TTOs, and patenting by
universities in the United States).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010). The right to exclude is central to the concept of a patent.
Professor Owen-Smith analogizes patents to “fences in the sense that they offer limited monopoly
rights to the ‘plot’ of knowledge their claims demarcate.” Jason Owen-Smith, Trends and
Transitions in the Institutional Environment for Public and Private Science, 49 HIGHER EDUC. 91,
94 (2005).
8. C.f. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A
Window on Competition, 31 RAND J. ECON. 129, 129 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Owen-Smith, supra note 7, at 94 (noting that “the efficacy of a patent depends
on its owners’ ability to police their property”); Alexander Poltorak, Thar’s Gold in Them Thar
Patents: Why It Pays to Protect Patent Portfolios, 12 UNIV. BUS. 18, 23 (2009) (noting that
“[a]lthough a patent is a right to exclude others, it doesn’t come with its own police.”).
10. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research
on Patent Litigation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND
PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 199-226, 205 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (“the patent premium flows
from patent litigation or, more typically, the threat of litigation”).
11. See generally DEREK C. BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 57-78 (2003); BURTON ALLEN WEISBROD, JEFFREY
P. BALLOU & EVELYN DIANE ASCH, MISSION AND MONEY: UNDERSTANDING THE UNIVERSITY
149-161 (2008); GEIGER, supra note 2, at 180-231.
12. But see Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents
in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 218-19 (2006) (in addition to “the growth in patentrelated litigation involving universities,” identifying “the stifling of discourse and the erosion in the
norms of sharing and colloquy historically associated with the scholarly enterprise” as costs related
to the gains to universities from engaging in technology transfer).
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realm, taking a qualitative approach toward building understanding of
assertive university patent enforcement from the perspective of a small
but important sample of decision-makers at universities that recently
asserted their patents. Findings provide unique insights into the complex
relationship between universities and their licensees, difficulties inherent
in university commercialization efforts, and how universities view their
simultaneous pursuits of mission and money through patents. Specific
revelations and suggestions flowing from the study include the
following:
•

•

•

•

•

•

Litigation As Mission-Enhancing: Some universities view participation
as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation as condoned or even
mandated by their research and commercialization missions, despite
what some critics view as the activity’s incompatibility with the notion
of a university’s public-serving mission.
Money As Motivator: Revenue generation is often a principal
motivator for universities that choose to enforce their patents through
infringement litigation, even though industry literature only indirectly
touts litigation’s revenue-generating potential.
Structural Deterrents: The high cost of legal fees, concern for being
viewed as overly litigious, and reputational risks related to contingency
fee arrangements with outside law firms provide disincentives for
some universities contemplating pursuit of patent infringers.
Fear of Retribution: The identity of would-be defendants may cause
some institutions to abandon pursuit of their infringement claims out of
concern for retribution to the university, particularly with respect to
sponsored research funding.
Litigation Realities Driving Licensing Decisions: Concern for the
responsibility and costs involved in litigating non-exclusively licensed
patents may lead some institutions to favor an exclusive licensing
strategy for their patents, on the belief that doing so will save them
money and may even spare their involvement as a plaintiff in any
infringement action.
Litigating Unlicensed Patents: Although many universities may be
hesitant to litigate unlicensed patents, shrewd companies have devised
a way for them to turn unlicensed patents into putatively licensed ones,
thereby contravening the Bayh-Dole Act’s purposes and masking the
character of what some may view as speculative enforcement activity.

In view of its content, this article should be of interest to a variety
of audiences, including but not limited to the following:
•

University Technology Transfer Professionals: TTO professionals
represent the primary university doors through which industry contact
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•

•

and commercialization occur. As such, controversies or discussions
that may give rise to patent infringement litigation are more likely to
involve or emanate from these offices than they are other sectors of the
university. This article provides salient description of how five
prominent TTOs frame and approach such conflicts. The policy
concerns and considerations highlighted here provide fodder for
further discussion and reflection on the activity and the possible
development of industry best practices concerning patent enforcement.
Scholars: While the costs and consequences of university involvement
in technology transfer garner perennial scholarly attention, such
treatment typically focuses on patent licenses, patent applications, and
14
royalty streams. With the current influence of entrepreneurialism on
higher education, more attention is being given to university start-ups,
spin-offs, and the efficacy of the Bayh-Dole system in creating jobs
15
and spurring regional economies. This article breaks new ground by
providing much needed investigation into an overlooked arena of the
university commercialization enterprise. Scholars interested in
empirical studies of patent litigation, complex institutional behavior,
and technology transfer and commercialization will find this article’s
approach and findings useful for guiding further inquiry and analysis.
Policy Makers: America’s patent system has received no shortage of
attention lately from lawmakers and educational policy leaders alike.
Indeed, many universities and higher education industry groups

13. See SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 23 (2004) (identifying TTOs as “interstitial
organizations” that connect markets with higher education).
14. See, e.g., Joshua B. Powers, Commercializing Academic Research: Resource Effects on
Performance of University Technology Transfer, 74 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 26 (2003); Joshua B.
Powers & Eric G. Campbell, University Technology Transfer: In Tough Economic Times, CHANGE:
THE MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 43-47; Jerry G. Thursby, Richard Jensen, &
Marie C. Thursby, Objectives, Characteristics and Outcomes of University Licensing: A Survey of
Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59 (2001); and Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C.
Thursby, Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 MGMT.
SCI. 90 (2002).
15. See generally Donald S. Siegel & Phillip H. Phan, Analyzing the Effectiveness of
University Technology Transfer: Implications for Entrepreneurship Education, in 16 ADVANCES IN
THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, & ECON. GROWTH (Gary Libecap ed., 2005);
ROBERT E. LITAN & ROBERT M. COOK-DEEGAN, RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION
AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM (2011); Letter from Mary Sue Coleman, Co-Chair, Nat’l
Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship, to Gary Locke, U.S. Secretary of Commerce
on
University
Commercialization
(Apr.
19,
2011),
available
at
http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12084; Michael N. Bastedo & Nathan F.
Harris, The State Role in Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: Governance, Oversight,
and Public University Start-Up Innovation, in 19 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION, & ECONOMIC GROWTH (2009); Michael M. Crow, The Research University As
Comprehensive Knowledge Enterprise: A Prototype for a New American University, in UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH FOR INNOVATION (Luc E. Weber & James J. Duderstadt eds., 2010).
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lobbied in favor of the sweeping reform to the nation’s patent laws that
16
Congress enacted in the fall of 2011. With the potential—and
17
reality—of billion-dollar patent infringement verdicts, massive
18
defensive accumulation and licensing of patents, and increased
attention by the Supreme Court on fundamental questions of patent
19
law, public dialogue continues to intensify concerning the
20
appropriate contours of how patents are acquired and used. As
drivers of innovation and holders of many patents, universities have an
important role to play in these debates. By examining the legal and
policy questions inherent in how some universities choose to use their
patents, this article offers fresh, colorful, and relevant perspectives that
bear further reflection by policy makers interested in aligning patent
laws and policies with the public interest.
Lawyers for Universities: In-house counsel at universities without a
history of involvement in patent litigation may be uncertain as to

16. See Goldie Blumenstyk, U.S. Senate Passes Sweeping Overhaul of Patent System,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 8, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/US-Senate-PassesSweeping/126649/ (noting support for patent reform by the Association of American Universities);
see also Letter from Hunter R. Rawlings III et al, President, Ass’n. of Am. Univs., to the Honorable
Patrick Leahy, Chairman, and the Honorable Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate
Committee
on
the
Judiciary
(June
27,
2011),
available
at
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Documents&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentID=6117 (indicating support of the Association of American Universities, the American
Council on Education, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association of Public and
Land-grant Universities, the Association of University Technology Managers, and the Council on
Governmental Relations). Admittedly, others within the higher education community opposed
patent reform. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Several Universities Oppose Pending ‘Patent Reform’
Legislation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 21, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/severaluniversities-oppose-pending-patent-reform-legislation/34091 (noting the opposition of WARF and
others). For more on the new law, see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-029, 125
Stat. 284 (2011).
17. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Apple Wins $1.05 Billion Verdict, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Aug.
24, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/apple-wins-105-billion-verdict.html (reporting
that jury awarded $1.05 billion to Apple in damages for competitor Samsung’s infringement of
Apple’s utility and design patents claiming various features of handheld devices).
18. See Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1
(2012) (describing advent of mass patent aggregators and their business model).
19. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012)
(invalidating as encompassing laws of nature patents claiming methods for calibrating proper
dosage of thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1794 (2012), cert granted, 132 S.Ct. 1794 (2012) (certiorari granted to
determine whether human genes are patentable).
20. See, e.g., LEWIS HYDE, COMMON AS AIR: REVOLUTION, ART, AND OWNERSHIP (2010)
(questioning the private rights theory of IP ownership); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public
Law, 20 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 41 (advocating for the treatment of patent validity challenges as
public law litigation); Robin Cooper Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs (Aug. 10, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127558 (arguing that “IP rights
[have] become the vehicles for IP wrongs” and suggesting creation of a doctrine of inappropriate
use of intellectual property).
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where to turn for insights into the challenges and opportunities posed
by patent enforcement. By relying on the informed opinions of TTO
professionals at universities with vast experience litigating patents, this
article serves as a handy primer for in-house counsel first approaching
the subject area. Outside counsel to universities also may find this
article helpful in understanding common university concerns and
orientations toward patent enforcement and in educating new
university clients on the topic, as appropriate.

Now for a few words on what follows. Part I provides a brief
background on patent infringement litigation involving university
plaintiffs, including information on the activity’s costs, historical
incidence, and how leading voices within the technology transfer
community view the activity. Part II details the methodology used in the
study conducted for this article. It describes the research questions that
guided the study, its theoretical framework, information on participants
and how they were selected for inclusion, and other information
concerning data collection. Finally, Part III presents and discusses the
study’s findings, which are arrayed thematically.
II. BACKGROUND ON UNIVERSITY PATENT ENFORCEMENT
A.

Definitional and Procedural Issues

Universities can become involved in various forms of litigation
involving patents, including litigation related to the prosecution of
patents, disputes concerning inventorship, defense of patent
infringement allegations, and common law disputes over contractual
issues that concern patents. 21 While all of the aforementioned activities
loosely may be labeled “patent litigation,” this article takes a narrow
focus on one form of patent litigation: lawsuits in which a university, by
itself or with another party, alleges infringement of one or more claims
of a university-owned patent. 22
Universities that own patents are not treated differently from other
patent owners under prevailing interpretation of patent law by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”). Thus, any lawsuit in
21. Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 639-644 (2011) (discussing the variety of university
involvement in disputes concerning patents).
22. I use university to mean any non-profit, public or private, undergraduate- and graduatedegree granting institution located in the United States that engages in patenting and technology
transfer, including any university-controlled, or closely-affiliated, patent or research entities that
may be separately incorporated from the university.
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which infringement of a university-owned patent is alleged must, as a
matter of patent law, include the university patent owner as a named
plaintiff. 23 As a practical matter, this legal constraint leads to an obvious
result in situations where a university owns an unlicensed patent over
which it wishes to sue. The university simply will sue the alleged
infringer on its own. However, in situations where a university owns a
patent and subsequently licenses it to a company, the university
ultimately cannot escape involvement as a named plaintiff in an
infringement action involving the patent, so long as less than “all
substantial rights” to the patent have been transferred to the licensee.24
B.

Costs

Patent infringement litigation has been called the “sport of kings”
because it is costly, complex, and uncertain. 25 Survey data collected in
2010 from law firms specializing in intellectual property (“IP”) 26 law
revealed that for patent infringement lawsuits with $1 million to $25
million at risk, the mean cost for one party to take a case through trial
and any appeal was $2,769,000. 27 For lawsuits with over $25 million at
risk, the mean cost was $6,018,000. 28
In addition to the high costs typically involved in pursuing patent

23. See, e.g., AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(vacating and remanding patent infringement case for failure to join university patent owner as
plaintiff). Universities can avoid participating as named plaintiffs in such lawsuits by incorporating
a separate legal entity to own and license patents for the benefit of the university. For a discussion
of the various ways in which universities structure their technology transfer operations, including
structures that avoid university involvement as named plaintiffs in infringement litigation, see Jacob
H. Rooksby, University Involvement in Patent Infringement Litigation, 47 LES NOUVELLES,8-18
(2012).
24. The CAFC has interpreted “all substantial rights” to include many different rights, but the
right to sue for infringement is “particularly dispositive.” Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v.
Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Alfred E. Mann Found.
for Sci. Research. v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that “the nature
and scope of the licensor’s retained right to sue accused infringers is the most important factor in
determining whether an exclusive license transfers sufficient rights to render the licensee the owner
of the patent”); Jeffrey L. Newton, Assuring All Substantial Rights in Exclusive Patent Licenses, 44
LES NOUVELLES 235-254 (2009) (reviewing CAFC precedent with respect to “all substantial rights”
in patent licensing); Timothy Denny Greene, “All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent
Licensee Standing, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2012) (same).
25. Douglas J. Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, TECH. REV. (Apr. 28, 2004),
http://www.technologyreview.com/business/13562/.
26. This article uses the term IP exclusively in reference to patents.
27. AIPLA, LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
I-153, I-154 (2011).
28. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/5

8

Rooksby: When Tigers Bear Teeth
ARTICLE 5 - ROOKSBY_DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

WHEN TIGERS BARE TEETH

4/4/2013 4:30 PM

177

infringement litigation, some have lambasted university participation in
the activity out of concern that it betrays the public’s trust. 29 These
critics argue that universities receive tax subsidies in order to pursue
public goods such as teaching and conducting research, not for
participating in litigation aimed at protecting the market exclusivity of
the university’s patent licensees. Given that taxpayers fund sixty percent
of all universities’ research activities through the award of federal
research grants, 30 university participation in patent infringement
litigation strikes some as all the more inappropriate.
In addition to these reputational concerns, participation in patent
infringement litigation can lead to other indirect costs as well, such as
the opportunity cost of having key personnel consult with attorneys
about litigation strategy, review and produce documents during
discovery, and testify in depositions and/or at trial. With respect to
university participants, patent enforcement activity also may lead to a
decrease in TTO productivity. 31
Out of presumed concern for the above costs, some universities
may seek to avoid enforcing their patents through infringement
litigation. This inclination, however, can lead to a different price: being
seen as a weak defender of IP by coveted commercial partners, whether
current or prospective. As Howard Bremer, an architect of the BayhDole Act, told me, “a lot of private sector companies, the big ones, look
at universities as toothless tigers, because they are not going to assert
their patent rights. One of the primary reasons, of course, is the cost
involved.” 32
C.

Frequency of Occurrence

Comprehensive empirical research into lawsuit filings shows that in
fact many universities engage in enforcing their patents through

29. See, e.g., JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 161 (2005).
30. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 24.
31. See Scott Shane & Deepak Somaya, The Effects of Patent Litigation on University
Licensing Efforts, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 739 (2007) (reporting that university involvement in
patent litigation correlated negatively with the number of new patent licenses and new exclusive
licenses filed by universities in subsequent years).
32. Bremer, supra note 1. See also Marie Powers, Patent Litigation: Sometimes It’s A Risk
TRANSFER
TACTICS
(Mar.
30,
2011),
Worth
Taking,
TECH.
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2011/03/30/patent-litigation-sometimesit%E2%80%99s-a-risk-worth-taking-2/ (“Universities are almost always inclined to try to settle a
dispute before heading to court, but TTOs engaged in this process need to understand that
companies often take advantage of this inclination.”).
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infringement litigation, despite the direct and indirect costs noted
above. 33 Indeed, over sixty American universities (both public and
private) participated as plaintiffs in over 245 patent infringement
lawsuits filed between January 1, 1973 and December 31, 2010.34 Given
the limitations inherent in data collection concerning historic litigation
activity, the actual numbers of patent infringement lawsuits filed by
universities and university plaintiffs participating in those actions
undoubtedly are higher. 35 Regardless, for those universities that have
litigated their patents, some victories have been significant 36—as have
some defeats. 37

33. Jacob H. Rooksby, Universities That Litigate Patents (May 2012) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author).
34. Id. For other quantitative reports of university involvement as plaintiffs in patent
infringement lawsuits (covering smaller time periods), see Rooksby, supra note 21, at 660
(reporting 57 patent infringement lawsuits filed by universities between Jan. 1, 2009 through Dec.
31, 2010) and Christopher M. Holman, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo-Kansas City, Presentation at
Santa Clara and School of Law Symposium: University Patent Litigation (Jan. 30, 2009), available
at http://www.chtlj.org/sites/default/files/media/symposiums/v025/slides/holman.ppt (reporting 190
patent infringement lawsuits filed by universities between Jan. 1, 2000 and Jan 24, 2009).
35. Rooksby, supra note 33.
36. See, e.g., Todd Bishop, Microsoft’s Eolas Settlement: UC Gets $30.4M, THE MICROSOFT
BLOG (Oct. 10, 2007, 5:02 PM), http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2007/10/10/microsofts-eolassettlement-uc-gets-30-4m/ (reporting that University of California received $30.4 million in a
settlement of a patent infringement lawsuit it brought with its licensee against Microsoft Corp.);
Susan Kelley, Hewlett-Packard, Cornell Reach Settlement in Patent Case, CORNELL CHRON.
ONLINE (June 9, 2010), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June10/HPCaseClosed.html (reporting
that Cornell University settled on confidential terms a patent infringement lawsuit it brought against
Hewlett-Packard after court reduced university’s damages award to $71.3 million); Katherine
Lymn, U Heads for “Patent Cliff,” THE MINN. DAILY (Oct. 6, 2011),
http://www.mndaily.com/2011/10/06/u-heads-’patent-cliff’ (reporting that University of Minnesota
received more than $350 million in running royalties from GlaxoSmithKline since 1999 as a result
of settling a patent infringement lawsuit university brought in 1998); Tom Fontaine, Pitt Awarded
$73.6 Million in Patent Case, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW (April 25, 2012, 2:14 PM),
http://triblive.com/news/adminpage/1125208-74/patent-varian-pitt-million-universities-courtuniversity-percent-sales-award (reporting that judge ordered medical device company to pay
University of Pittsburgh $73.6 million for infringing university’s patent, doubling the jury’s award
after finding willful infringement); Rich Lord, Carnegie Mellon Wins $1.17 Billion in Patent Case,
POST-GAZETTE
(Dec.
27,
2012
12:26
AM),
http://www.postPITTSBURGH
gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/carnegie-mellon-wins-117-billion-in-patent-case668013/ (reporting that jury found company knowingly infringed university-owned patents directed
toward hard-disk drive circuit technology and awarded university over $1 billion in damages).
37. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(invalidating on appeal patents owned by the University of Rochester in patent infringement lawsuit
against pharmaceutical companies); Goldie Blumenstyk, Taking on Goliath: U. of Rochester Risks
Millions in Patent Fight with Pharmaceutical Giants, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 20, 2002, at
A27 (reporting that University of Rochester had established an eight-figure legal fund to pursue the
aforementioned case); Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(invalidating on appeal patents co-owned by New York University and vacating and reversing
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Technology Transfer Community Urges Caution

While the participation of universities as plaintiffs in patent
infringement litigation is not infrequent, virtually no research has been
conducted on university decision-making about patent enforcement or
the intra-institutional impact of university decisions to pursue such
litigation. 38 However, a few leading groups within the technology
transfer community have issued cautions.39 For example, in a white
paper released in 2007 by Stanford University and ten other prominent
American research universities, the authors urged that “enforcement
action should be carefully considered.” 40 The authors stressed that
universities should be mindful of their mission to use patents to promote
technology development for society’s benefit. 41 To that end, the
universities argued that litigation is “seldom the preferred option for
resolving disputes” and should be pursued only if there is a “missionoriented rationale for doing so” that can be clearly articulated to internal
constituencies and to the public. 42
The Association of University Technology Managers (“AUTM”)
—the leading industry group for university technology transfer
professionals—subsequently endorsed the Stanford white paper, as did a
National Academy of Sciences committee established to review
university IP management. 43 The National Academy of Sciences
committee wrote in its report that “enforcement of IP rights against
suspected infringers should be approached carefully to protect the
In furtherance of this
institution’s resources and reputation.” 44
suggestion, the committee recommended that a university’s decision to
litigate a patent should reflect its reasons for obtaining and licensing
patents in the first instance. Listed examples included:

record-setting $1.67 billion jury award in patent infringement lawsuit brought by university and its
exclusive licensee).
38. For one notable exception, see Shane & Somaya, supra note 31.
39. See generally Press Release, Leland Stanford Univ., In the Public Interest: Nine Points to
Consider in Licensing University Technology (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://wwwleland.stanford.edu/group/OTL/documents/whitepaper-10.pdf
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON MGMT. OF UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROP.: LESSONS
FROM A GENERATION OF EXPERIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DIALOGUE, MANAGING UNIVERSITY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 82 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza
eds., 2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13001&page=1.
44. Id. at 7.
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contractual or ethical obligations to protect the rights of
existing licensees to enjoy the benefits conferred by the
licensees;
disregard by an infringer of scientific or professional
norms and standards, such as use of medical technologies
outside standards of care or professional guidelines;
disregard by an infringer of the institution’s legitimate
rights, for example, as evidenced by a refusal to negotiate
45
a license on reasonable terms.

The committee concluded that while infringement litigation is rarely the
preferred method for resolving patent disputes, “it is an option important
for universities to retain.” 46
III. METHODOLOGY
A.

Questions for Research

In an effort to build understanding of the considerations and
pressures that influence university participation as plaintiffs in patent
infringement litigation, I took a qualitative approach in the study
described here to investigate a simple yet surprisingly unanswered
couplet of questions concerning how university decision-makers regard
university patent enforcement. Namely, what factors or constraints do
they report considering in determining whether to litigate their
university’s patents? And how do they weigh fundamental concerns for
revenue generation and allegiance to university research missions in
their decisions to enforce university patents through infringement
litigation? 47
A qualitative interview approach was deployed in order to collect
evocative data not available from other sources, such as university press
releases, court filings, or judicial opinions. 48 I anticipated that the

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Given the confidential and often sensitive nature of university activities in this realm, I
did not solicit details concerning any specific cases involving participants’ universities (whether
contemplated, ongoing, or completed). While some participants referenced details of such cases
during interviews, I tried to steer their comments toward the hypothetical, as the study’s purpose
was not to document institutional histories of patent enforcement actions. I wanted interviewees to
draw on these experiences only insofar as they were helpful in explaining institutional practices,
beliefs, and decision-making.
48. For an excellent and recent example of qualitative methods used in IP legal scholarship,
see David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L.
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study’s sample size would be small, given the sensitivity of the research
topic and the difficulty of securing participation from qualified
participants, of which there are not many. Additionally, there are very
few university leaders in a position to make decisions about patent
litigation, and even fewer ones with fresh experience doing so. In light
of the potential value of many patents and the proprietary nature of
patent rights, those with knowledge understandably are reluctant to
divulge key elements of strategy and decision-making. With these
realities in mind, I determined that an exploratory study relying on a few
key informants with deep knowledge of organizational history and the
practice of patent enforcement within their universities (and more
broadly) would be appropriate and add significantly to the knowledge
base. 49
B.

Theoretical Framework

Academic capitalism theory and the “two-good” framework help
situate this study. 50 Academic capitalism theory suggests that university
decision-makers—facing pressures to find new sources of revenue while
steeped in an academic culture that views faculty output as potentially
proprietary and lucrative—are predisposed to monetize intellectual
property when possible. 51 Patenting provides an attractive vehicle for
doing this. While licensing patents to industry is the traditional method
for universities to generate revenues from research investments, it is not
the only method. 52 Alleged infringers may be sued for the purpose of
obtaining lucrative damages awards or extracting favorable licensing
arrangements through out-of-court settlements. Many see such pursuit
REV. 335 (2012) (collecting data through in-depth interviews and analysis of contingency fee
agreements); see also Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 927-940 (Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer eds.,
2010) (describing the appropriateness of qualitative methods to examine under-explored legal issues
or situations).
49. For further justification for studying small samples to provide insight into rare but
significant events, see James G. March, Lee S. Sproull & Michal Tamuz, Learning from Samples of
One or Fewer, 2 ORG. SCI. 1 (1991).
50. The canonical works on academic capitalism theory include SHEILA SLAUGHTER &
LARRY L. LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL
UNIVERSITY (1997) and SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 13. See generally WEISBROD, ET AL.,
supra note 11, for an introduction to the two-good framework of higher education.
51. See Diana Rhoten & Walter W. Powell, The Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Expanded
Protection Versus New Models of Open Science, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 345, 362-63 (2007)
(noting the considerable financial pressures on universities to “compete in the research marketplace
through protecting and profiting from their investments”).
52. Poltorak, supra note 9.
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as a “common rationale for patenting,”53 albeit one that may place
universities in “awkward positions with regard to their treatment of . . .
the public trust.” 54
The two-good framework articulated by Weisbrod, Ballou, and
Asch recognizes that universities must balance “mission goods”—such
as supporting faculty and student research through patenting and
technology transfer efforts—with “revenue goods,” or activities
primarily aimed at generating money to support further investment in
mission goods. 55 Thus, while maintaining the public’s trust in
universities’ research missions is important, universities simultaneously
engage in “crass money-making activities” to generate revenue that can
be used to further their commendable social missions.56
Mission activities and revenue activities are not always neatly
separable. 57 Some are best described as hybrid activities that further
both mission and revenue goods. 58 Whether mission or money
predominates in any given university activity likely depends on the
university and the particular values at stake. Tensions can arise in that
all universities, whether public or private, “can be expected to seize
opportunities to enhance profits.” 59 However, when doing so conflicts
with an important mission good, the actual or contemplated revenuegenerating activity may yield.60
University patent enforcement is in many ways a delicate hybrid
activity shaped by these complex forces.61 A university’s strong patent
53. Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study,
17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 118 (2010); cf. Poltorak, supra note 9, at 18
(questioning that “if not for the unspoken threat of litigation, who would ever license a patent,
which, at the end of the day, is nothing more than a right to sue for infringement?”).
54. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 13, at 112.
55. WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 11, at 58-76.
56. Id. at 2; see also Bok, supra note 11.
57. The myriad activities associated with collegiate athletics, specifically Division I football
and basketball programs, help illustrate this point. For example, lucrative endorsement deals with
athletic companies that provide top-of-the-line equipment may help collegiate players enhance their
skills as student-athletes (a mission good) while also generating revenue for the athletic program (a
revenue good).
58. WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 11, at 68-70.
59. Id. at 69.
60. For example, many prestigious and highly-selective colleges and universities likely could
generate substantial revenue by auctioning off to the highest bidders a set number of spots in their
entering freshmen classes each year. Of course, doing so undoubtedly would compromise their
reputations for academic excellence—a mission good they value deeply—so they continue to use
largely merit-based criteria in making admissions decisions.
61. It is also possible that other paradigms help explain university patent enforcement, in
addition to or instead of the two-good framework and academic capitalism theory. I selected these
two to use as a framework given their plausibility and the significant attention they have garnered in

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/5

14

Rooksby: When Tigers Bear Teeth
ARTICLE 5 - ROOKSBY_DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

WHEN TIGERS BARE TEETH

4/4/2013 4:30 PM

183

enforcement practices could lead to additional revenues and research
investments. Such practices also could alienate other funders and
undermine public trust in important university research missions. But so
could weak enforcement practices. Thus, gaining insight into how
university decision-makers interpret and approach this complicated
activity was the study’s guiding aim.
C.

Participants and Methods

Drawing on previous research 62 and working with a knowledgeable
gatekeeper, interviewees were drawn from a population consisting of
high-level TTO personnel at universities identified as having recent
experience participating as a plaintiff in one or more patent infringement
lawsuits. High-level TTO personnel were targeted as study participants
given that such individuals typically are deeply involved in any
university decision to bring a patent infringement lawsuit.63 In addition
to working with faculty inventors to identify and protect patentable
developments, TTO personnel negotiate deals with businesses willing to
license and commercialize university-owned patents. When an infringer
is identified, these professionals liaison with the patent’s faculty
inventor(s) and industry licensee(s) to help university decision-makers
understand the risks and benefits of bringing an infringement action.
The purposeful, non-random sampling technique resulted in
targeted interviewees at five universities ultimately enrolling in the
study. Tape-recorded interviews ranging from forty minutes to over one
hour were conducted with the participants at AUTM’s 2011 annual
meeting in Las Vegas, Nevada. 64 Operating from a constructivist
paradigm, 65 I took a participatory role in the interviews, exploring with
participants the nuances of issues by attempting to give voice to a variety
of plausible arguments, positions, or concerns I believed to be held by

the higher education literature.
62. See generally Rooksby, supra note 21.
63. No doubt others, such as university counsel, are involved in these decisions as well.
However, I chose to target high-level TTO personnel for participation in the study given their
deeper level of daily focus on technology transfer operations.
64. Transcripts for the interviews referenced in this article are on file with the author and
Akron Law Review.
65. Constructivism is a theory of knowledge aimed at building understanding of complex
phenomena. Rather than seeking an inflexible, etched-in-stone truth, constructivism treats inquiry
as a process of constructing a defensible perspective on reality, always subject to further
development and refinement. See Egon G. Guba & Yvonna S. Lincoln, Competing Paradigms in
Qualitative Research, in HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 105, 110-116 (N. K. Denzin &
Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 1994).
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industry, academic, or policy stakeholders.66 Interview data were
transcribed and analyzed using an inductive coding process with a view
toward identifying emerging themes and outlier opinions. 67
All participants were males and held a director-level or equivalent
senior policymaking position in a TTO at five different public
universities across the United States at the time of data collection.68
While study participants certainly do not speak for all universities that
have litigated patents, their comments do offer meaningful insights into
an important subset of them.
In addition to the interviews, relevant data were gleaned from
observations of a speech by AUTM’s president and attendance at a oneand-one-half hour session at the meeting entitled “IP Enforcement and
Infringement Issues for Universities.” 69 According to the meeting
program, the purpose of the session was to “explore the advantages and
disadvantages of enforcing and litigating patents, including strategies for
dealing with patent litigation cases.” 70 I also spoke informally about the
research topic with various attendees throughout the annual meeting and
logged pertinent conversations as field notes. I used some of the issues
identified in the aforementioned presentation and conversations as points
of discussion with the interviewees. 71
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Findings are arrayed thematically in the subparts below, which also
contain interwoven reactions and commentary concerning how the
findings expand understanding of the nuances and difficulties presented

66. I did, however, follow a general script of questions that helped structure the interviews.
These questions are included in Appendix A.
67. See JOHN W. CRESWELL, EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: PLANNING, CONDUCTING, AND
EVALUATING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (3d ed. 2008) for a description of these
methods and their appropriateness for this type of study.
68. I have withheld participants’ specific job titles, as well as additional details about their
universities and backgrounds, in the interest of protecting their confidential participation in the
study.
69. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM 2011 ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM:
IMPROVING
THE
ODDS
32
(2011),
available
at
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Meeting_Home2&Template=/CM/ContentDispla
y.cfm&ContentID=5392.
70. Id.
71. Handouts for the session were distributed electronically before the annual meeting began.
Thus I was able to draw on these materials and other existing literature to formulate interview
questions. The specific questions I asked in each interview were similar, although some questions
changed or developed based on issues or themes that emerged from previously completed
interviews. See Appendix A for the general script of questions.
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by university patent enforcement.
A.

“God Forbid”: Universities Litigate Patents

Speaking on the last day of the annual meeting, AUTM’s incoming
president addressed the membership and outlined the organization’s
purpose and goals. In describing the role of university technology
managers, the incoming president stated:
We are licensing and business development professionals. We
handle technologies from inception through research; we
handle conflict of interest issues; we close the deals with our
commercial partners and then (God forbid) we participate in
litigation on our own or with our licensees to protect our, and
72
our inventors’, technology rights.

Several attendees at the meeting had mentioned to me that AUTM as an
organization can be less than forthcoming with data or information that
potentially could be viewed as critical of university involvement in
technology transfer. 73 For example, some point to the fact that, since
1999, AUTM’s widely cited annual licensing survey has not collected
information on litigation costs expended by universities, out of apparent
concern for skewing the data on legal costs.74 Professor Gary Rhoades
views this exclusion as emblematic of AUTM’s “effort to track mostly
the credit side of the accounting ledger, monitoring the growth of
activities and revenues, but not assessing the net gains.” 75 For these
reasons, the incoming president’s forthright placement of university
patent enforcement as— “God forbid” 76 —within the job description of
TTO personnel struck me as significant. Do universities now view

72. Robin Rasor, 2011-2012 AUTM President, Incoming AUTM President’s Speech at the
AUTM 2011 Annual Meeting in Las Vegas, NV (Mar. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Documents&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentID=5537 at 1.
73. Indeed, some attendees seemed to perceive the mere mention of university patent
enforcement as inherently critical, speculating that few TTO directors, if any at all, would be willing
to talk with me about it.
74. See Gary Rhoades, Housing the Measurement of University Innovations’ Social Value:
Organizational Site, Professional Perspective, Institutional Outlook, in 19 ADVANCES IN THE
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION & ECONOMIC GROWTH 237, 244 (2009) (“[T]he
AUTM survey provides data on legal fees, but since 1999, these figures have only included the
costs of patent prosecution, and have not included major litigation fees of universities, or the costs
of university or externally hired attorneys who deal with technology transfer issues.”).
75. Id. at 244.
76. Rasor, supra note 72.
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participation as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation as an
inevitable result of their involvement in patenting and technology
transfer?
According to some of the presenters at the annual meeting session
on “IP Enforcement and Infringement Issues for Universities,” they
should. 77 An attorney in private practice moderated the session, which
featured three panelists with experience working for or with TTOs in
matters involving patent infringement litigation. The moderator opened
the session by noting that universities increasingly must contemplate
enforcing their patents through infringement lawsuits. She listed the
economic crisis, reduced federal and state funding for higher education,
drop-offs in donations, and the need to find ways “to increase revenue
while trying to keep tuition as reasonable as possible for many
struggling American families” as background factors.
Before
introducing the panelists, she concluded by saying that “intellectual
property is a vital asset, and if appropriately utilized, can provide large
returns. The most popular ways to capitalize on IP include licensing and
enforcement.”
The speaker with the presentation most relevant to my study was a
partner at a boutique, IP litigation law firm that has significant
experience representing universities in patent infringement litigation.
He spoke at length about the common concerns he hears from
universities that are contemplating enforcing their patents through
infringement litigation. His slide presentation and discussion listed
those concerns as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Litigation is not part of our mission statement
University’s reputation
Relationships
Prominent alumni
Donors
Industry partners
Cost of litigation
78
Approximately $3 million to $5 million through trial

Touching on the toothless tiger concern, he noted that “infringers

77. Transcript of session on file with the author.
78. Joseph F. DePumpo, Partner, Shore Chan Bragalone DePumpo L.L.P., Speech at the
AUTM 2011 Annual Meeting in Las Vegas, NV: IP Enforcement and Infringement Issues for
Universities (Mar. 2, 2011) at 2 (slide presentation available through AUTM and on file with
author).
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use all of the above to their advantage,” thinking that universities will
not actually be bold enough to sue them. 79 Others also have detected
university hesitancy to sue, alleging that “universities are widely
considered meek when it comes to enforcing their patents.” 80 Often this
perception is correct, the presenter stated, as universities are afraid of
being labeled “highly litigious,” and some apparently even mistakenly
fear that assertive patent litigation activity could negatively affect their
U.S. News and World Report rankings.
The presenter concluded that universities’ concerns are overstated,
and that all universities need to consider enforcing their patents. He
challenged universities to ask themselves, “Why do we get patents if we
are not willing to enforce them?” Noting that enforcement action is a
“tremendous untapped revenue source,” he suggested that diminishing
state funding of higher education may turn infringement litigation into
an attractive gap filler. The presenter also posited that universities are
sympathetic litigants, as “no one wants to see universities get taken
advantage of.” Assuring the crowd that many top research universities
“regularly enforce their patents,” he cited recent cases brought by the
California Institute of Technology, the University of Virginia, the State
University of New York, and the University of Illinois as examples.
Despite the activity’s regularity when viewed from a national
perspective, no participant in my study professed having to consider
with any predictable frequency whether to pursue an infringer. One
participant said such discussions occur “once every two to four years,”
while the others indicated they are roughly a once-a-year occurrence.
Simon 81 echoed some of the concerns mentioned by the attorney in the
session on IP enforcement, which he attended. He said he thought that
“most universities tend to sort of shy away from litigation. They’re
scared of it, because it has this big seven-figure cost associated with it.”
As participants disclosed, however, some universities have explored
creative ways to decrease or even eliminate their out-of-pocket legal
costs in pursuing patent enforcement actions.
B.

“It Just Didn’t Feel Right”: Contingency Fee Litigation and the
Image of the Troll

All participants cited the high cost of litigation as an important
consideration in their decision-making. Several mentioned pursuing
79.
80.
81.
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litigation on a contingency fee basis with an outside law firm as a
potential cost-saving measure. If a law firm takes a case on a pure
contingency fee basis, the firm receives payment (typically fifteen to
fifty percent of the amount collected) only if the plaintiff wins a
monetary judgment or receives money as part of a settlement
agreement. 82 Long associated with personal injury cases, contingency
fee arrangements increasingly are prevalent in patent infringement
litigation, particularly in lawsuits brought by “patent trolls.” 83 Patent
trolls often bring infringement actions on a contingency fee basis, as
doing so does not require payment of any out-of-pocket legal fees.84
Many hold an unfavorable view of patent trolls—neutrally referred to as
non-practicing entities (“NPEs”)—because they can delay the fruits of
innovation from reaching and benefitting the public.85 Some companies
have argued that universities active in litigating are patent trolls because
they do not practice their patents, although universities’ substantial
support of faculty inventors and engagement in other socially beneficial
activities persuasively undercut this argument. 86 The image of the troll

82. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004) (reporting contingency fee rates from fifteen to
fifty percent); see also Schwartz, supra note 48, at 360 (reporting contingency fee rates from 28% to
40.2%). Blended arrangements—which combine contingency payments along with fee-for-service
payments—also exist.
83. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 343-356. A patent troll is a pejorative term for an entity
that does not manufacture, develop, or sell any product covered by the patents it owns, and instead
sues alleged infringers as its primary method of reaping financial returns on investment. See
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) for a discussion of patent trolls
and their function in today’s patent system. See also Ashby Jones, When Lawyers Become
ST.
J.,
B1,
Jan.
23,
2012
available
at
“Trolls,”
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203750404577173402442681284.html; Ira Glass
& Chicago Public Media, When Patents Attack! THIS AMERICAN LIFE (July 22, 2011),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack.
84. See Schwartz, supra note 48.
85. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012)
(comprehensively testing the criticisms of and justifications for patent trolls); see also JEFFREY H.
MATSURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS (2008) (arguing that patent trolls are as old as the
patent system itself).
86. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008) (“University patent owners aren’t trolls in my view when they
contribute previously unknown technology to society, rather than just imposing costs on others by
obtaining and asserting legal rights over inventions independently developed by others.”); Feldman,
supra note 20, at 19 (“University behavior . . . tends to be quite different from that of garden-variety
trolls, and some commentators are uncomfortable grouping the two together.”); Jeremiah S. Helm,
Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The Disparate Impact of eBay v.
MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331, 335 (2006) (“The
undeniable fact is that universities are active innovators, while patent trolls, almost by definition, are
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raises the concern, however, that the manner in which universities
litigate their patents may impact how others view universities’
commercialization activities. 87
Although all participants were familiar with contingency fee
arrangements, not all indicated they are supportive of them. Two
participants spontaneously voiced concern for their institutions being
viewed as patent trolls without my having used that term earlier in the
interview. For example, Simon expressed concern for contingency fee
arrangements because of the potential that others would see such
litigation as troll-like. As he explained:
It’s an issue for us in the sense that we don’t—these have to be
genuine cases of true infringement. We always worry about being a
troll, and I think that’s a fear that perhaps builds into the way
universities react, is that they don’t want to be pictured as sort of
acting like trolls in this environment.

One participant, Roberto—who indicated that his institution had
spent over $10 million in legal fees on the last patent infringement
lawsuit it brought—recommended that institutions newer to technology
transfer consider contingency fee arrangements if they are looking to
save costs. His institution, however, had tried such arrangements before
and has decided it likely will not pursue them again in the future. He
told me why:
Roberto:

It was one of those things where if we, given
what happened . . . I would say, I think, we
wouldn’t do that again. We wouldn’t do it
on a contingency fee.

not. . . . [T]his difference is key.”). Some universities’ involvement with “mass aggregators,” a new
species of NPE, may eventually undermine their professed commitment to serving as socially-useful
bastions of research and innovation. Perhaps soon to become more disruptive to the patent system
than patent trolls, mass patent aggregators are entities like Intellectual Ventures that acquire vast
numbers of patents for purposes of licensing and privateering. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note
18, at *36 n. 33 (noting that 5.3% of Intellectual Ventures’ patent portfolio comes from
universities). The fifty universities revealed in Ewing and Feldman’s research appear to be
investors in Intellectual Ventures and/or suppliers of the company’s patents.
87. Cf. Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2193 (2009)
(noting the enduring perception of universities as patent trolls and calling the perception “something
that universities and their TTOs should take great care to avoid”); Arti K. Rai, The Increasingly
Proprietary Nature of Publicly Funded Biomedical Research: Benefits and Threats, in BUYING IN
OR SELLING OUT? THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 117, 119
(R. G. Stein ed., 2004) (noting that universities and their licensees have asserted their basic research
patents “in a manner that hinders rather than facilitates commercial development.”).
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JR:

Why is that? Just because . . . ?

Roberto:

[The attorneys] we hired were people who
were very, very good at negotiating
settlements, but were not in any way, shape,
or form prepared to go to court . . . . We’re
not complaining. They were successful. It
just didn’t feel right to the people in the
office.

[46:169

Roger—who previously worked at a large state university’s TTO,
but recently had accepted a leadership position at a different university’s
TTO—said he saw contingency fee litigation as “really almost the only
way to go” for his new institution, given its lack of resources. He
recognized that others often view the arrangement dubiously, but he said
the arrangement’s unfavorable perception would not deter decisionmakers at his institution from pursuing litigation on a contingency fee
basis if they felt the university had a great case. Indeed, he noted that
contingency fee litigation may hold the most appeal for universities that
are open to pursuing patent infringement litigation but do not have the
money or internal commitment to pay out-of-pocket for legal fees.88
Of course, contingency fee arrangements are not without risks or
consequences, as Roberto recognized by saying suing on contingency
“just didn’t feel right to the people in the office.” His comment touches
on the limitations inherent in the two most common payment models for
outside counsel: whereas fee-for-service attorneys are financially
incentivized to over-prepare for trial (thereby costing the university
more money), lawyers working on contingency may under-prepare for
trial, in hopes of achieving early payment through settlement. While
universities unquestionably save money in the short-term by engaging
attorneys on a contingency fee basis, in the long-term such arrangements
may endanger universities’ reputation as well-prepared litigants if the
case does not settle and instead goes to trial. For public universities in
states like Hans’s—where the state attorney general must approve all
major litigation decisions contemplated by the state’s public
universities—the reputational risks to the institution may counsel against

88. For example, an in-house counsel of a large public university told me at the meeting that
her university will not pay any amount of money to bring patent infringement actions. However,
she said it is not fundamentally opposed to bringing them, and mentioned contingency fee
arrangements as a viable option. See also Schwartz, supra note 48, at 376-377 (noting that
contingency fee representation solves the problem of cash-strapped universities having to pay
hourly-billing patent litigators).
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a university’s bringing a case on contingency, despite the potential cost
savings.
C.

“I Mean Really”: Money Matters

When asked what factors motivate their institution to bring a patent
infringement lawsuit, all participants mentioned the hope of receiving
money through a damages award or out-of-court settlement. This
finding would be unremarkable except that nowhere does AUTM, the
National Academy of Sciences committee, or the authors of the Stanford
University white paper explicitly mention the pursuit of revenue as a
reason to pursue patent infringement litigation (although concern for
“disregard by an infringer of the institution’s legitimate rights”—a
potential motivation listed in the report issued by the National Academy
of Sciences committee 89—arguably may be viewed as code for revenue
generation). But as Roberto told me, “We’re not gonna go and sue
unless there’s, you know, that we think that there’s money there.” Hans
agreed. “If you feel like there’s a payday, then you should litigate,” he
said. Roger expressed this belief even more concisely when I asked him
why universities sometimes choose to enforce their patents by asserting
them in infringement actions: “Uhhh, financial return. I mean really.” I
understood his tone either as cheeky—he was saying what people know
but do not say publicly—or baffled, in that he could not believe I did not
know the answer to my question. 90
After thinking about it further, Roger also mentioned the
importance of projecting “the appearance that you’re actually sticking up
for your IP,” and “being able to go back to the faculty and say, ‘Hey,
look. We’re standing behind the IP.’” But considerations of pleasing
faculty inventors were secondary for most participants, if mentioned at
all. As Roger explained, the institution is always asking, “What do we
stand to gain from this? You know, are we going to knock out a
competitor to our licensee, allowing our licensee to get more market
share and pay us more royalties?” Several participants indicated that if
the potential financial return through participation were not great, their
institution would be disinclined to pursue the litigation, even if the facts

89. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 8.
90. Participants’ focus on extracting revenue from patents by litigating them is consistent
with what some scholars view as the general approach universities take toward technology transfer.
See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 87, at 2169 (finding that “university technology transfer activities
continue to be predominantly patent-centric and revenue-driven with a single-minded focus on
generating licensing income and obtaining reimbursement for legal expenses.”).
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were otherwise in their favor. Perhaps unsurprisingly, no one mentioned
“disregard by an infringer of scientific or professional norms and
standards” as a motivating factor to sue, as suggested by the National
Academy of Sciences committee. 91 According to the participants,
pursuing a patent infringement case always involves practical
considerations of money, often more plainly than ethereal concerns for
advancing mission.
As part of the monetary calculation, one participant mentioned that
the amount of legal fees his university would have to pay to participate
as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation is more important to
university decision-making than the amount of money the institution
stands to gain from bringing such an action. Sam explained that his
university is more concerned with stopping “serious infringement,
serious damage to the university or a business partner” than it is viewing
litigation as a moneymaking opportunity. Because of his university’s
not unusual sensitivity to costs, who pays for the litigation matters, and
the university attempts to broker cost-sharing arrangements for litigation
whenever possible (others also mentioned cost sharing with licensees as
a common approach, and that individual licenses often dictate who will
pay and how much they will pay). Sam said it would be hard to imagine
his university being disinclined to participate as a plaintiff in a patent
infringement lawsuit if its licensee were willing to bankroll the
litigation. 92 His advice to other institutions that might be considering
bringing their first enforcement action touched on this concern for costs.
Participating as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation is “like
renovating an old house,” he said. “Double or triple your budget for
time and money and effort.”
D.

Exclusive, Non-Exclusive, and Unlicensed Patents

Participants mentioned that the licensing status of the infringed
patent—i.e., whether the patent is exclusively licensed, non-exclusively
licensed, or not currently licensed—impacts how their universities view
the proposition of bringing infringement litigation. Some scholars have
criticized exclusive licenses of university patents as failing to maximize
91. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 8.
92. Past analysis of historical licensing data provided to AUTM by its university members
shows a statistically significant relationship between a university’s expenditure of legal fees and the
likelihood that a licensee will reimburse the university for its legal fees. See Kesan, supra note 87,
at 2169. However, as mentioned earlier, AUTM’s annual licensing survey specifically excludes
significant litigation expenses from its definition of legal fees. See Rhoades, supra note 74 &
accompanying text.
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social returns on federal R&D investment. 93 Regardless, many
universities find exclusive licenses attractive because companies are
willing to pay more for the enhanced market share that necessarily
accompanies the ability to exclude competitors.94
Hans identified an additional benefit to universities choosing to
license their patents exclusively rather than non-exclusively: with
exclusively licensed patents, the university is likely to bear fewer
enforcement costs and responsibilities. He indicated that his university
avoids non-exclusive deals in part for that reason:
We’re interested wherever possible in not being the direct litigants, and
that has shaped our philosophy about how we license. So we might
have a choice between doing exclusive licenses or non-exclusive
licenses. All things being equal, we’d rather do exclusive licenses
because when we do a non-exclusive license, we really don’t shed that
responsibility for protecting IP on behalf of our non-exclusive
95
licensees.

The suggestion that some institutions may choose to license their patents
exclusively as opposed to non-exclusively, largely to avoid or diminish
the burden of enforcement costs and obligations, is startling yet
previously unexplored by scholars.96 Roberto echoed Hans’s preference
for exclusive licenses for a related reason. “If we don’t exclusively
license [a patent],” he said, “there’s probably not enough money to make
[bringing litigation] worth it.” He indicated that his institution had never
sued over a patent that was licensed non-exclusively.
I also explored with participants whether their institution ever had
sued or would consider suing over an unlicensed patent (i.e., a patent for
which no company has taken a license to practice the technology the
93. See, e.g., MOWERY, ET AL., supra note 6, at 191 (criticizing exclusive licenses as being
oftentimes detrimental to the public good and urging that universities pursue “nonexclusive
licensing agreements for the fruits of publicly funded research whenever possible”).
94. See, e.g., WEISBROD, ET AL., supra note 11, at 158 (stating that “the greater the monopoly
power the licensee is granted, the more it would pay for the patent license”).
95. His understanding of patent law on this point is correct. See Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent
Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A nonexclusive license confers no constitutional
standing on the licensee to bring suit or even to join a suit with the patentee because a nonexclusive
licensee suffers no legal injury from infringement.”).
96. However, ultimately whether a court could compel a university to participate as a
plaintiff in a given patent infringement lawsuit turns on whether the university owns “all substantial
rights” to the patent in suit. See supra notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text. For previous
empirical studies of university licensing, see for example, Kesan, supra note 88; Powers, supra note
14; Powers & Campbell, supra note 14; Thursby, Jensen, & Thursby, Objectives, Characteristics
and Outcomes of University Licensing, supra note 14; and Thursby & Thursby, Who Is Selling the
Ivory Tower?, supra note 14.
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patent discloses). Nearly all expressed hesitancy to do this, although one
took the position that universities should at least be willing to consider
doing it, even if it means evoking the image of the troll. Roger said: “I
understand if you don’t have licensed patents that it may be perceived,
you know, this trolling issue. I’m not sure I 100% agree with that. I
think you need to enforce patents, period. Whether or not they’re
licensed is a factor, but it shouldn’t be a major factor.” Lawsuits
brought over an unlicensed patent could mean that the university is
pursuing what Simon aptly termed an “assertion licensing” strategy—
i.e., initiating infringement litigation as a means by which to license
patents or, if the case does not settle, obtain rents through a damages
award. Suits involving an unlicensed patent also could mean that a
prospective licensee declined to license the university’s patent, yet went
ahead and practiced the patented technology anyway, thereby effectively
inviting the lawsuit. Whatever a particular university’s reason for
bringing an infringement action over an unlicensed patent, such cases
are not hypothetical: indeed, nine American universities filed ten
different cases over unlicensed patents in the two-year period from 2009
through 2010. 97
In the prevailing complex patent ecosystem, rife with secondary
markets for patents, 98 examining the nature of a university’s licensee
may in fact be more telling than inquiring whether there is a licensee for
any given university patent that is litigated. As several industry vendors
mentioned to me at the AUTM meeting, litigation management
companies have developed a business model aimed at assisting
universities wary of asserting their unlicensed patents.99 In such
arrangements, a litigation management company creates a special NPE
for the purpose of receiving an exclusive license from the university to
an unlicensed patent. The arrangement is not structured in the typical
way, where the licensee intends to produce (or is already producing) a
product covered by the patent, and in turn generates royalties for the
university from sales of the product. Instead, the NPE exists solely for
the purpose of acquiring all substantial rights to the university’s
97. Rooksby, supra note 21, at 662. Relatedly, thirty-four percent of all patent infringement
lawsuits brought by universities from 1973 through 2010 did not include a licensee co-plaintiff
(although not all of these cases necessarily involved unlicensed patents). See Rooksby, supra note
33.
98. See generally Chien, supra note 83 (describing the secondary market for patents); Ewing
& Feldman, supra note 18 (same).
99. An example of such a company is General Patent Corporation, which specializes in
PATENT
CORP.
(2011),
enforcing
university
patents.
See
GENERAL
http://university.generalpatent.com/. Poltorak, supra note 9, is the company’s CEO.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/5

26

Rooksby: When Tigers Bear Teeth
ARTICLE 5 - ROOKSBY_DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

WHEN TIGERS BARE TEETH

4/4/2013 4:30 PM

195

unlicensed patent and asserting an infringement action based on it. This
arrangement effectively transfers university ownership of the patent in
exchange for a contractual right to a portion of any proceeds generated
by the NPE in the litigation. 100
One attribute of this type of arrangement is that it removes the need
for universities to participate as named plaintiffs in the ensuing
infringement actions. Another is that it typically requires no out-ofpocket costs from universities, as the entire enforcement activity is
structured on a contingency fee basis. 101 Should any money be returned,
the university receives a portion of it. 102
Several participants confirmed the general contours of this type of
arrangement, although all said their universities never had engaged in it.
Sam surmised that it is probably more popular with small universities
lacking the financial or political capital to litigate a patent that they have
not been able to license.
E.

Tigers Take Bribes? Infringer Identity and Retribution

Participants cited a prospective defendant’s identity as relevant to
their universities’ decisions concerning patent enforcement.
A
frequently mentioned example was concern for the research conducted
by faculty unrelated to the invention and commercialization of the
infringed patent. Hans, for example, professed being sensitive to the
concern that a potential defendant that also sponsors faculty research
might withdraw its funding if the university sues the company. He
defended this sensitivity by saying that “just because you have patent
rights doesn’t mean you have to litigate against someone who’s

100. The Bayh-Dole Act places limitations on the assignment of university-owned patents.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(A), universities may not assign patents developed with federal funds
without the approval of the federal agency that provided those funds, unless the “assignment is
made to an organization which has as one of its primary functions the management of inventions.”
While the exception likely was drafted with assignments to established, university-affiliated
research foundations in mind (like, e.g., WARF), the wording of it arguably does not preclude
application to NPEs created for the express purpose of managing inventions through asserting
infringement litigation.
101. One vendor told me that litigation management companies commonly seek outside
investors to help fund incidental costs related to this type of enforcement activity. These investors
then share in any returns generated by the activity.
102. It bears noting that the Stanford white paper—which AUTM and the National Academy
of Sciences committee endorsed—urges universities to be mindful of arrangements such as these,
stating that universities “would better serve the public interest . . . by requiring their licensees to
operate under a business model that encourages commercialization and does not rely primarily on
threats of infringement litigation to generate revenue.” See Leland Stanford Univ., supra note 39, at
8.
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infringing,” although he recognized that “you’re opening the door for
others to infringe” by allowing this concern to dissuade one’s institution
from litigating.
Roberto also identified infringer retribution as a potentially
deterring factor, although his institution has established financial
resources intended to neutralize its impact:
A couple of times when we have filed suit, of course, then the
company we sue pulls money from our [faculty] investigators. And we
have made it a policy when that happens, we go and make them
whole . . . . So I think with our latest litigation, there are at least four,
maybe six, professors that we had to make whole.

No other participant indicated that his institution has a policy of
“making whole” faculty who lose sponsored research funding because of
their university’s decision to sue for infringement the company that
funds the research. Sam and Roger agreed, though, that the infringer’s
identity can be a deterring factor. “No one would admit that proudly or
in a steadfast, outward manner,” Sam said, “but that has been part of the
discussion I have encountered from time to time.”
Simon was the lone participant who bristled at the notion of taking
a defendant’s identity into consideration in deciding whether to sue,
mostly because of the signal he believes it could send to other potential
licensees. As he described:
I get concerned when I hear implications that people say, well, we’ve
got this major research partner and donor, and why would we sue
them? Especially when they’re infringing rights we granted to another
partner, especially a small partner. The first day a university says,
“I’m sorry, I don’t wanna sue and support you, small business, because
your big-business competitor is gonna take away all my research
dollars,” that’s a huge nail in the coffin of university technology
licensing, because why would a venture capital company say, “I’m
gonna put my money into this small company. I know we’re probably
likely to have to sue, because we’re trying to make a constructive
change, but there’s this big industry out there, and they can give ten
million dollars to the university. Not a problem.” So they give you ten
million dollars to make the litigation go away. . . . That toothless tiger
is worse when it’s not just a toothless tiger, it’s willing to take a bit of
a bribe—an inducement not to participate.

Simon expressed further concern that faculty inventors (who, as
mandated by the Bayh-Dole Act and institutional IP policies, receive a
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percentage of royalties the university derives from any patents that list
them as inventors) 103 could sue the university for failing to support their
rights if the university elected not to pursue an infringer.
The participants’ recognition that patent enforcement may bring
financial ramifications for the activities of university faculty distant from
the issues of the litigation speaks to the complexities of varying and
sometimes conflicting university missions. Universities facing threats or
perceived threats that faculty will lose research funding if a patent
infringement lawsuit is brought against an influential company no doubt
confront a difficult decision: pursue an infringer to please a licensee
and/or to receive financial rewards, or yield to a threat that could affect
unrelated faculty research funding. Is the former foolish? Is the latter a
bribe (as Simon suggested)? Universities in this dilemma appear to face
a Morton’s-fork choice involving complicated allegiances to money and
mission.
F.

When Mission Means Money, Tigers Bare Teeth

All of the participants grappled in some way with harmonizing the
revenue-generating potential of patent infringement litigation with the
socially beneficial aims of the university. Commercialization and
mission were the leading buzzwords in this process of explanation.
Several noted that their universities had made technology
commercialization a goal of their institution’s research mission, and
therefore felt that litigation over the commercialization of technology
was implicitly condoned. Although participants recognized that some
view patent infringement litigation as an inappropriate activity for
universities to engage in as plaintiffs, none shared this belief. Most, in
fact, described patent infringement litigation as consistent with their
institution’s research mission, suggesting that they had heeded the
pronouncement from the authors of the Stanford University white paper,
that litigation should be initiated only if there is a “mission-oriented
rationale for doing so.” 104 Hans’s description—in response to a question
about potential public relations concerns raised by suing for
infringement—is emblematic:

103. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (2012) (requiring “the contractor to share royalties with the
inventor”); see also Margaret T. Stopp & G. Harry Stopp, Jr., The Enforcement of University Patent
Policies: A Legal Perspective, 24 SRA J. OF RES. ADMIN. 5 (1992).
104. Leland Stanford Univ., supra note 39, at 6.
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Hans:

Do you mean, would we be concerned
about suing someone, because people could
say, universities shouldn’t sue?

JR:

Right, that’s what I’m getting at.

Hans:

No, no, we’re okay. You know, we just
gotta write the correct press releases. You
know, ‘cause it allows people to understand
that we’re doing this because it’s what the
patent system is supposed to allow us to do.
It’s important to our mission. We just have
to tie it back to our mission. So, yeah, I’m
not concerned about that.

JR:

So suing could be OK if you do it consistent
with the research mission?

Hans:

Oh, it’s absolutely consistent. I mean, [our
university] has as part of its mission,
commercializing technology. It’s in the
mission statement. It’s unusual. Educating,
writing, doing service, you know, teaching,
graduating students; and commercializing
technology. It’s one of the things we do.

[46:169

When commercialization is the goal, participants indicated that
bringing patent infringement litigation must be an available option, even
if the activity rankles some faculty members or offends others’ notion of
what a public university ought to be doing with its resources. Although
Hans understands why some faculty may object to the activity,
ultimately he is not influenced by their concerns:
I can easily understand why my colleagues would be nervous about
suing. It’s something that really puts it out there in people’s faces that
we’re doing commercialization. . . . The faculty—there are concerns
that commercialization is wrong. They came to the university to get
away from those kinds of considerations. So . . . there’s a little bit of a
cultural clash, which we resolve by commercializing technology in a
way that serves the mission of the university and doesn’t pull off in a
different direction.
....
That’s just how we have to do it. You know, the founding fathers put
patent protection and copyrights in Article 1, Section 8, of the
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Constitution. They thought having patent rights was a good idea. . . .
We’re supposed to make the world a better place. And if we have to
use commercialization—which is a perfectly legitimate set of
practices—to achieve our mission, we should.

Hans’s references to the Constitution and making the world a better
place illustrate what I saw as a common attempt among participants to
find a respected hook on which to hang the hat of university patent
enforcement, which otherwise often gets lumped as one of several
uncelebrated “practices” within the vague meaning of the word
commercialization. Simon also situated the activity within a higher
calling, citing President Barack Obama’s focus on university innovation
as effectively requiring universities to consider patent infringement
litigation. “At some point,” he said, “if you believe in [the White
House’s innovation agenda], you’ve gotta be willing to fully support all
elements of IP protection, which includes litigation. And if you wanna
talk the talk, you better walk the walk.”
Simon’s comment about “walking the walk” implicitly references
the economic realities of patenting. Patents are blunt instruments that
have been likened to toll booths. 105 “The threat of damages and,
typically, injunctive relief, is a proverbial club useful in securing license
fees and other payments from actual and potential infringers.” 106 Failure
to enforce a patent could mean the loss of the premium conferred to a
university from seeking and obtaining the patent, as “the efficacy of a
patent depends on its owners’ ability to police their property.” 107 Simply
put, a company that infringes a university’s patent may perceive little
incentive to stop infringing unless sued.
Participants very much appreciate the foregoing constraints.
“That’s why you file patents, is to support them and enforce them,”
Roger said. “You know, big places, when you file a patent, there’s
gonna be infringement. It’s just the nature of the beast, and there’s real
advantages to stepping up to the plate and enforcing it,” he said. Sam
agreed, stating that “the reason to get patents in the first place is to
control their use in the market.” Simon acknowledged these realities in

105. See Walter W. Powell, Jason Owen-Smith & Jeannette A. Colyvas, Innovation and
Emulation: Lessons from American Universities in Selling Private Rights to Public Knowledge, 45
MINERVA 121, 123 (2007) (stating “patents represent a toll booth”); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 51 (2004) (calling
patents “blunt instruments”).
106. Sichelman & Graham, supra note 53, at 118-119.
107. Owen-Smith, supra note 7, at 94.
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the frankest of terms:
A patent without enforcement is a piece of paper with Dave Kappos’s
signature on it. That’s all it is, you know. It’s a very expensive piece
of paper. I can get Dave Kappos’s signature for a lot less than
108
$30,000. . . . If you’re not willing to enforce it, that’s all you’ve got.

Although participants understand the economic realities of patents,
and in fact view their institutions’ participation as plaintiffs in patent
infringement litigation as essentially an inevitable consequence of
engaging in technology transfer, several acknowledged that their
university’s leadership is not always receptive to pursuing infringement
litigation. On the one hand, university administrators prefer (and some
may even expect) their TTOs to generate revenue; on the other hand,
those same administrators not always are comfortable admitting to
various constituencies that revenue generation or commercial goals drive
or should drive most aspects of their TTO’s mission. However, all
participants stated that when fostering commercialization is part of a
university’s stated or implied mission (as increasingly is the case),109
initiating patent infringement litigation occasionally can further that
mission, and is not by definition inconsistent with it. Participants may
have to remind administrators that they did not create the patent system
or the commercialization framework contemplated by the Bayh-Dole
Act; however, they are constrained to operate within that system and
framework, which means using patents to exploit the limited monopoly
they confer on their holders, be it through licensing or litigation. 110 As
Simon described:

108. At the time of data collection, David Kappos was the Director of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, the governmental entity that awards patents. Depending on various factors,
obtaining a patent can cost anywhere from $10,000 to $45,000 or more in legal fees, and thus
Simon’s reference to $30,000.
109. See, e.g., Michael M. Crow, Beyond the “New Normal” in American Higher Education:
Toward Perpetual Innovation, in SMART LEADERSHIP FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN DIFFICULT TIMES
50-69, 58 (David W. Breneman & Paul J. Yakoboski eds., 2011) (calling commercialization “the
most obvious avenue to move academic research at the ‘edge of newness’ from the laboratory to the
marketplace.”).
110. Should a university elect to retain title to an invention discovered in the course of
research funded in part with federal money, the university must diligently seek to patent the
invention, unless the agency funding agreement provides otherwise. See SEAN O’CONNOR,
GREGORY D. GRAFF, & DAVID E. WINICKOFF, LEGAL CONTEXT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 29 (Nat’l Research Council: The Nat’l Acad. 2010),
available
at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_058897.pdf.
Sponsored research agreements typically place universities under the same obligation.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/5

32

Rooksby: When Tigers Bear Teeth
ARTICLE 5 - ROOKSBY_DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/4/2013 4:30 PM

WHEN TIGERS BARE TEETH

201

If our mission is to get technology out there to benefit the public, one
way we do that is we engage the patent system to protect it so that
others will invest money. Because of that, we have the ability to
exclude competitors for a limited time. You’ve got to buy into the
notion that the way you get that monopoly is by enforcing those
patents. If you don’t understand that, you’ve missed the principle of
this element of our mission.
That’s just the rules of the game. “You like that royalty income. We
don’t talk about the money. It’s not about the money. But trust me,
you’d like me to bring several million dollars a year more into the
university.” You’ve got to understand it comes with that price. If
you’re not willing to play that game, then that money isn’t coming, and
you won’t be able to serve that part of the mission effectively. At
some point, it’s part of it, in my mind.

While the complex union between mission and money goes
undeclared at many universities engaged in patenting and technology
transfer, comments from participants in this study unveil what some
within higher education may view as an uncomfortable truth: when
revenue generation is a university research mission, patent infringement
litigation is an activity that can further that mission. Indeed, it may even
reveal it.
G.

Summary

The study described in this article was driven by an interest in
building understanding of university patent enforcement from the
perspective of key decision-makers at universities recently involved as
plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits. Points of inquiry included
probing participants for the main factors or constraints their universities
consider in determining whether to enforce their patents through
infringement litigation, as well as gaining insight into institutional
balancing of revenue generation and allegiance to university research
mission through the pursuit of patent infringement litigation.
Findings suggest that some universities view participation as
plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation as condoned or even mandated
by their research and commercialization missions, despite what some
critics view as the activity’s incompatibility with the notion of a
university’s public-serving mission. On a practical level, revenue
generation is often a principal motivator for universities that choose to
enforce their patents through infringement litigation, even though
industry literature only indirectly references litigation’s revenue-
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generating potential. In this regard, when it comes to enforcing patents,
universities’ research goals and revenue-generating goals seem deeply if
not inextricably intertwined.
The high cost of legal fees, as well as concern for being viewed as
overly litigious (troll-like), may provide disincentives for some
universities contemplating pursuit of patent infringers.
While
contingency fee arrangements with outside law firms can help
universities counter the high cost of enforcing their patents in court,
reputational risks related to these arrangements may deter their use.
Additionally, the identity of would-be defendants may cause some
institutions to abandon pursuit of their infringement claims out of
concern for retribution to the university, particularly with respect to
sponsored research funding.
The nature of the infringed patent (i.e., whether it is exclusively
licensed, non-exclusively licensed, or unlicensed) can impact decisionmaking as well. Concern for the responsibility and costs of litigating
non-exclusively licensed patents may lead some institutions to favor an
exclusive licensing strategy for their patents, on the belief that doing so
will save them money and may even spare their involvement as a
plaintiff in any infringement action. Although many universities may be
hesitant to litigate unlicensed patents, shrewd companies have devised a
way for them to turn unlicensed patents into putatively licensed ones,
thereby contravening the Bayh-Dole Act’s purposes and masking the
character of what some may view as speculative enforcement activity.
V. CONCLUSION
Several participants noted that universities as a group tend to avoid
discussion of patent infringement litigation as an aspect of technology
transfer. As Simon described it, “It’s one of those things we don’t like
to talk about. We like to talk about patents and licensing. But we don’t
like to talk a lot about [litigation].” Examining university patent
enforcement may be uncomfortable for some universities and
policymakers, but overlooking the phenomenon only undermines
comprehension of the net effects of university involvement in
technology transfer.
While quantitative data are growing, the study described here is the
first dedicated qualitative attempt to build understanding of the nuanced
factors that impact university decisions concerning patent enforcement.
Its findings should encourage decision-makers at universities heavily
engaged in patenting and technology transfer (as well as those just
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beginning to build capacity in these areas) to critically examine
institutional goals and dispositions to use patent infringement litigation
to protect and enhance university research missions in the public
interest. In short, universities must confront a difficult but inescapable
question: When it comes to enforcing our patents, will our university be
a tiger with teeth?

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013

35

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 5
ARTICLE 5 - ROOKSBY_DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

204

4/4/2013 4:30 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[46:169

APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Tell me about your current position and the work that you do.
When I say “university initiation of patent infringement litigation,”
what does that mean to you?
In what capacities within your institution have you been involved
with that activity in the past?
I’m interested in getting your thoughts on the activity in general.
What factors do you believe motivate universities in general to litigate
patents?
Are those the same factors that typically motivate your institution to
litigate patents?
How important would you say is the question of who pays legal
fees to your institution’s decision to litigate patents?
How important would you say are the opinions of groups like
students, faculty, inventors, licensees, and the general public concerning
planned patent infringement litigation to your institution’s decision to
initiate such litigation?
How important is the potential for revenue generation to your
university in deciding whether to sue for patent infringement?
How big would the potential return to your institution from
participating in an infringement suit as a plaintiff have to be in order to
make the suit “worth it,” in your opinion?
Do you believe that initiating infringement litigation is an
inevitable activity for institutions that have a significant number of
licensed patents? Would you put your institution in that category?
Do you see the activity as central to, or in furtherance of, your
institution’s research mission?
Do you know if your institution budgets for bringing patent
infringement suits? If so, could you tell me how your institution plans

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/5

36

Rooksby: When Tigers Bear Teeth
ARTICLE 5 - ROOKSBY_DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

WHEN TIGERS BARE TEETH

4/4/2013 4:30 PM

205

or prepares for the activity?
What is the primary factor that would likely deter your institution
from bringing a patent infringement lawsuit, assuming you were
confident that a company were infringing? Or do you always bring
lawsuits if you think you’ve located an infringer?
What’s the highest level of individual within your institution that
would have to sign off on a decision to bring a patent infringement suit
(e.g., VP for Research, President, full governing board vote, vote of
chair only, etc.)?
What role, if any, does any separately incorporated research entity
controlled by your institution play in any decision to bring a patent
infringement action? Does that entity ever participate as a plaintiff in
combination with, or instead of, your institution in such suits?
Are there any pieces of advice or words of caution that you might
give to other institutions that may be contemplating bringing a patent
infringement action?
How frequently is this activity discussed within your institution or
at industry gatherings like AUTM’s annual meeting, would you say?
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